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Louise Cainkar 
ISLAMIC REVIVAL AMONG 
SECOND-GENERA TION ARAB-AMERICAN 
MUSLIMS: THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE AND 
GLOBALIZATION INTERSECT 
This article examines the chain of events that facilitated an Islamic revival 
among second-generation Arab-American Muslims. Based upon research in 
metropolitan Chicago, it argues against trends in the literature that describe 
Western-born Muslims as foreigners, immigrants or, worse, anti-Western. 
Similarly, it argues against setting their religious experiences solely in a domes­
tic context. The article begins by documenting the lack of religious institutions 
and practices among immigrant Arab Muslims before the 1990s and the limited 
religious socialization of their American-born children. These conditions 
emerged in part from secular trends in the immigrants' homelands. By the 
1990s, a period of global Islamic revival, both immigrant and second-generation 
Arab Muslims found practiced Islam attractive, particularly its capacity to pro­
vide meaning and resilience for their own experiences in America. Individual 
decisions to embrace Islam as more than a fact of birth were facilitated by devel­
opments resulting from globalization and the creation of American Islamic 
institutions, yet were, at the same time, intensely personal choices rooted in 
local experiences. Although Islamic revival is global, its conduits should not be 
viewed as causal. The article engages findings by Yang and Ebaugh (2001) and 
Hirschman (2003), arguing that analyses of religiosity in the United States 
must take into account historical contexts. Religiosity is an intensely personal 
experience that must be explained at the intersection of the individual, the local 
and the global. 
IsLAMIC REVIVAL IS A CDMPLEX historical process with individual, national, 
transnational and global components. Whether described as religious 
resurgence, the rise of fundamentalist interpretations of the Qutan, a 
return to theological foundations, or a political movement with religion 
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at its core, Islamic revival should be studied at both macro and micro 
levels in each society in which it has taken place in order to determine 
its universal and particular elements.1 Since structural processes in 
themselves do not explain situated individual behaviour, micro level 
studies help us to understand Islamic revival's local roots and appeal. 
That is, they help us to understand why individuals choose to be religious 
and, in the case highlighted by this article, why so many American-born 
Muslims are more religiOUS than their immigrant parents. 
(n this paper, ( look at the historical, local and global events that have set 
the stage for Islamic revival among second-generation Arab-American 
Muslims. Metropolitan Chicago is the site of empirically-grounded 
research placing the specific contributions of migration, transnational 
relationships and global Islamic revival in the context of a particular 
Arab--American Muslim experience. At the micro level, Islamic revival is 
defined as observable and measurable increases in the number of indi­
vidual Muslims who engage in religious practices (such as praying, fast­
ing and knowledge-seeking) and whose daily lives are informed by core 
beliefs about faith in God (spirituality) and Islamic philosophies. I argue 
that Islamic revival among second-generation Arab-American Muslims, 
a population often referred to as 'immigrants' in the literature on Mus­
lims in the West (although they are not), is an outcome of a complex 
series of historically-grounded events that offered Islam as a powerful 
tool providing meaning and resilience for the experience of growing up 
as a Muslim and an Arab in the United States. 
Standing at the intersection of history and biography (Mills 2000), this 
examination of Islamic revival shows that an individual's decision to 
embrace Islam as more than a fact of birth has been facilitated by devel­
opments resulting from globalization, yet was, at the same time, an 
intensely personal choice rooted in local experiences. In this article, I set 
the stage for ongOing oral history research on Islamic revival among 
second-generation Muslims in the United States and offer a new per­
spective on the phenomenon.2 
Uterature review 
In the social science literature, Islamic revival is usually discussed as a 
process particular to Muslim countries (see, for example, Berger and 
Hefner 2003). It is frequently noted for its appeal to the socially, politi­
cally and economically excluded. These assertions have led to widely­
accepted notions that the spread of Islam as a potent ideology is 
inherently related to political and socio-economic conditions in develop­
ing nations. Said Arjomand (2003) has described Islamic revival as an 
outcome of urbanization, modernization and increased literacy in the 
Muslim world. He explains its expansion from the Muslim core as one 
ISLAMIC REVIVAL AMONG SECOND-GENERATION ARAB-AMERICAN 101 
result of globalization-via migration, mass communications and ease of 
travel (to Mecca and other locales in that core). Arjomand takes issue 
with Benjamin Barber's (1995) narrow characterization of Islamic 
revival-and Islam itself-as inherently anti-Western and hostile, not­
ing, however, that this perspective is held by many political commenta­
tors and journalists. 
The assumption that Muslim countries are central to the process of 
Islamic revival carries over to social scientific analyses of Islam in the 
West, where the message and the messengers of Islamic revival are usu­
ally described as both foreign and anti-Western. Islamic revival in Europe 
is explained as a phenomenon rooted in immigrants and migration (that 
is, foreigners). Giles Kepel (2003,85), for example, states that "in order to 
understand the forms that Islamic identity takes in Britain, it is first nec­
essary to look closely at the most noteworthy elements of the history 
which the immigrants brought with them" (my emphasis). Similarly, his 
analysis of Islamic revival in France begins with a discussion of the 
Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) in Algeria. Masanori Naito's book (19%) on 
the Islamic awakening in Europe similarly focuses upon immigrants. His 
interpretation of the unfolding of Islamic revival renders a more accurate 
picture at the micro level than Kepel's, but one which still counterpoises 
Islam and Western culture. While Naito importantly anchors Islamic 
revival in local experiences, he decontextualizes it, thereby missing the 
link between global events and local outcomes, in other words, between 
history and biography. Furthermore, he explains the Islamic identity of 
the second generation as a product of their parents' religiosity and their 
upbringing. 
During the first decade of immigration, the Muslim immigrants had lit­
tle motivation for religious activities, they just earned money, saved, 
and sent it to their families in the mother countries. Since they have set­
tled with their families in the mid 1970s, Islam has revitalized as the 
norm and value of their life, for they were afraid that infiltration of the 
European life style and behavior into the Muslim youth would seriously 
damage the unity of family which is the most precious value for the 
Muslim. In addition, racial, ethnic and cultural discrimination also accel­
erate to build a wall between host and immigrant society. Thus, Islam 
became the strongest ties of the Muslim immigrants, and it built 
stronger and broader networks among immigrants than ethnic ties 
(Naito 1996; my emphasis). 
These types of analyses overstress the foreignness of the children of 
immigrants. Considered members of an 'immigrant society,' they are 
portrayed as cultural aliens (or, worse, enemy aliens) in the countries into 
which they have been born. A tautological argument then often follows: 
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Islam appeals to the second generation because they are essentially for­
eign (not French, or German, or American). Their essential foreignness is 
proven by their Islamic identity and practice. Having explained away a 
complex sociological process by reductionism, analytic discussion 
qUickly turns to the institutional level: mosques, organizations, leaders, 
fundamentalism, militants, and/or political Islam, the most visible parts 
of the puzzle and perhaps easier to comprehend. The fundamental con­
cepts of religiosity, spirituality and philosophy are bypassed and impor­
tant questions-why do people choose to be religious? why do many 
Muslims born in the West choose to be practising Muslims?- are never 
asked. 
Is there something peculiar about the children of Muslim immigrants 
that causes them, unlike other second-generation groups (Yang and 
Ebaugh 2(01), to mimic their parents in a near robotic manner? Or are 
these assumptions simply the outcome of limited grounded research? 
Islamic revival in the West must be understood as more than the prod­
uct of migration and culture clash (Huntington 1996), particularly when 
its adherents are native-born. The assumption that second-generation 
Muslims are foreign may be yet another (perhaps unintended) manifes­
tation of the allegations of Muslim stagnation that characterize much 
writing on Islam. Mamdani (2002) has noted: "Muslim culture is viewed 
as petrified .... Muslims conform ... while others make culture. Mus­
lims need to be rescued by the cultured." In point of fact, this character­
ization of Islam reflects the bias of the beholder: it has no place in 
scholarly work. 
In an important article on immigrant religions in the United States, 
Yang and Ebaugh (2001) present findings that resonate with the second­
generation American-Muslim experience. They accurately observe that a 
return to theological foundations (their term for a type of fundamentalism) 
occurs among second generations because they must bridge differences 
of culture and ethnic origin (internal pluralism) among co-religionists 
and because the II authority of a religion that is based simply on tradi­
tion loses its power" (280). Second-generation Muslims are seen as 
Americans and not foreigners and, like other religious groups, their 
religious practices and institutions are viewed as dynamic. However, 
while trying to fit Islam into their universal model of American immi­
grant religions, Yang and Ebaugh ignore the global aspect of Islamic 
revival Since the revival occurred first in the Islamic world, it cannot 
have solely -local (American) explanation. Rather, it must be viewed in 
the Ii�t.of the intersecti� of local and global factors. A slmilar� applies to Arab and South Asian Sunni Muslims migrated to .. US between the turn of the twentieth century and 
1980s:.their � secularism does not fit Herberg's 
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(1960) classic thesis that new immigrants become more religious after 
migration to the United States. As Hirschman (2003) notes, Herberg's 
thesis is limited by ahistoricity and does not fit all immigrant communi­
ties. The majority of Italian immigrants, for example, for reasons con­
nected to religiosity in their country of origin and their sojourning 
orientation, were not practicing Catholics in the early decades of the 
twentieth century. High levels of religiosity among Irish immigrants in 
the US during the same period are traced to a "Devotional Revolution" 
in Ireland and the subsequent export of Irish clergy to the United States 
(Larkin 1984). Hirschman's analysis points to the importance of examin­
ing religiosity in an historical context, taking into account events in 
immigrants' homelands and the context of their reception in the United 
States. 
Historically-grounded research can help to sort through these com­
plex macro and micro processes, global and local variables and differ­
ences between immigrant and second-generation religiosity. While I 
continue to unpack these processes through oral history research, this 
paper lays out the contextual background for my exploration of Islamic 
revival among second-generation Muslims in the US based upon histor­
ical research in Chicago's Arab and Muslim communities. In a footnote 
in his book, Globalized Islam, Olivier Roy states: "1 consider that it is 
becoming increasingly irrelevant to study Islam in the West through the 
prism of immigration" (2004,8). I agree. While the messengers of Islamic 
revival may be global in origin-immigrants, transnational relationships 
and mass communications-these conduits should not be viewed as 
causal. Religiosity is an intensely personal experience that must, in the 
end, be explained at the intersection of the individual, the local and the 
global. When viewed from this perspective, African-American Islam (the 
largest group of Muslims in the US) may not be an exceptional case that 
has nothing in common with 'immigrant Islam.' On the contrary, the 
study of African-American Islam offers insights into the relationship 
between religion, the course of world history and the patterns of indi­
vidual lives. Similarly, when examined in historical perspective, immi­
grant Muslims and their children may share common experiences with 
members of other religious groups in the United States. 
Metropolitan Chicago as a research site 
Metropolitan Chicago has one of the largest and most diverse Arab 
communities in the United States. It is composed of some 100,000 per­
sons/ of whom an estimated 70% are Muslims of varying economic sta­
tuses and countries of nativity. According to Census 2000, Cook County 
has the third-largest Arabic-speaking population by county in the US 
and Chicago has the fifth-largest by place. More than half of the Arab 
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TABLE 1. Arab immigrants intending to settle in Illinois by selected country of birth 
and proportion of all Arab immigrants intending to settle in Illinois 
"---- ---- ---"-
lord.nIP·lestine+ 
Iraq- (Includes Assyrians) 
Egypt 
Lebanon 
Syria 
KuwaitA (Palestinians) 
Yemen 
Thne countries as % of all 
Arab immigranll to Illinois 
SoIIrct: INS. Country of Birth data. 
1972 1980 
45% 36% 
16% 35% 
15% 10% 
10% 8% 
6% 6% 
2% 
97% 97% 
1986 
39% 
15% 
12% 
11% 
9% 
3% 
89% 
. "------- -- - --, --
1995 2000 Cumulative 
31% 31% 33% 
26% 16% 25% 
9% 6% 8% 
8% 5% 8% 
5% 10% 9% 
4% 4% 4% 
2% 
83% 71% 89% 
+ Ior""n lind Palestine lire combined because more titan 70% of Jordanian immigrants are of 
Palestini,," origin. Chicago has the largest concentrated Palestinian community in tlte US. (Stt 
CIIinkar J988.) 
• Until tltt mid·1990s, tilt overwhelming majority of Iraqi immigrants were Assyrian Cltristians. 
ChiCIJgo h4$ tltt lllrgtst Assyrian community in the US. 
1\ Wt lI$,.�ume tlult most or all of the immigrants from Kuwait are Palestinian. 
population of metropolitan Chicago is under the age of thirty and was 
born in the United States. The largest Arab-Muslim communities in 
Chicago are Palestinian and Egyptian, the former a lOO-year old com­
munity, the latter a more recent arrival. 
I have been conducting sociological research among Arab Muslims in 
the Chicago metropolitan area for twenty-two years. Since the early 
19905, I have observed a major transformation within this community, 
characterized by the increasing importance of religiosity on individual 
and institutional levels. On an individual level, religiosity is measured 
by actions that engage religious practices-most notably, praying and 
fasting-and actions that increase one's religious knowledge. Religios­
ity is also a subjective state that includes holding core beliefs about faith 
in God (spirituality) and perspectives on life issues informed by an 
'slamic philosophy. Wearing a I;lijab (headscarf) is often an expression of 
religiosity for Muslim women, although I believe that it is empirically 
the case that women may wear a I;lijab and not be religious (that is, wear 
:me for cultural reasons) or be religious and not wear a I;lijiib. On an 
institutional level, religiosity is measured by the presence of religiOUS 
institutions, as well as organizations that approach secular matters 
[such as civil rights or domestic violence) from a religious perspective. 
Corresponding to an increase in individual religiosity and religious 
Lnstitution-buiJding, I have observed the decreasing influence of secu­
ar, pan-Arab and nationalist organizations, values and perspectives. 
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This is not to say that all Muslims became religious after 1990 or that 
none were religious before 1990, but rather that the scales tipped signif­
icantly from the secular to the religious during the 1990s. 
This change is not explainable solely by migration, that is, by the pres­
ence of new immigrants from Muslim countries. A significant propor­
tion of the religiously-observant community is made up of the 
American-born children of immigrants who came to the US in the 1960s, 
1970s and 1980s. Many of these children have parents who are not them­
selves observant and have voluntarily chosen to practice Islam. This 
change is also not explainable solely by the influence of transnational 
experiences. Preliminary data analysis shows that the majority of sec­
ond-generation Muslims interviewed thus far in an ongoing study of the 
Islamization of the Arab- (and South Asian-) Muslim community in 
Chicago found Islam while fully embedded in their American lives. This 
points to the importance of examining local experiences to understand 
the appeal of Islam to American-born Muslims. 
Indeed, the phenomenon of increasing religiosity among Arab Mus­
lims in metropolitan Chicago is complex because migration and histori­
cal change intersect to produce varying outcomes over time. Newer, 
post-l990 Arab immigrants are more likely to be religiously-observant 
than pre-1990 immigrants because of the decline of secularism and the 
Islamic revival in their homelands. Second-generation Arab Americans 
who reached adulthood in a more secular time may have quite different 
experiences from those who did so in the 1990s, when religiosity was a 
popular and viable option. Members of the latter group may even pre­
cede their parents in the discovery of faith because of these historical cir­
cumstances. 
In this article, I wiI1 first examine the state of Islam among Arabs in 
Chicago in the early 19805. Next, I will note some of the objective indi­
cators of change in religiosity among Arabs that began appearing in the 
19905. Finally, I will examine some of the potential explanations for 
changes among second-generation Arab Americans. I will assert that 
Islamic revival among American-born Arab Muslims is a process that is 
properly explained only by considering the intersection of the global 
and the local. Universal Islamic themes appeal to many Arab Americans 
because they provide answers to local experiences. This means that 
Islamic revival in the US is not solely a foreign import, but also part of 
the American experience rooted in a globaUy-connected world. 
Chicago's Arab-Muslim communities 
Arab-Muslim migration to Chicago commenced in the late 1800s. By the 
early 1900s, Chicago was home to an Arab-Muslim community that was 
predominantly Palestinian and largely male. (There was also a primarily 
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Lebanese-Christian community of families.) When African Americans 
migrated to Chicago from the southern United States, Palestinians began 
a one-hundred-year economic relationship with their community, most 
often as traders, peddlers and shopkeepers. (The current economic rela­
tionship between these two communities is not without controversy, 
which is related to the Arab concentration in small grocery and liquor 
stores in African-American neighbourhoods.) Palestinian traders and 
shopkeepers lived in the African-American communities in which they 
worked, often at the back of their shops, or on their edges in boarding 
houses, until after World War II, when Palestinian family migration 
began. The Palestinian immigrants then moved to all-white neighbour­
hoods on Chicago's southwest side that bordered the so-called Black 
Belt. Middle-class Palestinians continued to move in a southwest trajec­
tory from these 'buffer areas' in the 1970s. In step with their ethnic 
European neighbours, who were fleeing neighbourhood decline and 
African-American expansion, middle-class Arabs moved to neighbour­
ing all-white suburbs. This movement persisted throughout the 1980s 
and 1990s, and began to include Palestinians of all income levels. Al­
though a core community of new immigrants and low- and middle­
income families remains on the southwest side of the city, the weight of 
the community has shifted to the suburbs, including new immigrants 
and some low-income families. A more recent migration of Yemenis has 
settled, like the Palestinians, on the south side and in the southwest sub­
urbs. Large numbers of Palestinian and Jordanian Christians have also 
migrated to Chicago, although their migration started later than the Mus­
lims and they are as likely to live on the north side of the city as the south. 
Arab Muslims from Iraq, Lebanon and Syria and Egyptian Muslims 
and Christians began migrating to Chicago in the 1950s, initially as stu­
dents in most cases. After 1%5, the size of these groups increased, espe­
cially as visas became available for skilled professionals and their 
famili�, but their numbers have never approached those of the large 
Palestinian community in Chicago. At least one out of every three Arab 
immigrants intending to settle in Illinois since 1965 has been Palestinian 
(see Table 1). Their actual proportion as a percentage of Arabs in Illinois 
is much higher than this because a large number of the migrants from 
Iraq are Assyrians and not Arabs. Although Illinois has an historic 
Lebanese community, it is one of the few states in which persons of 
Lebanese and Syrian ancestry are outnumbered by other Arabs (Arab 
American Institute 2000). 
Unlike Palestinian Muslims and Yemenis, who are concentrated on 
the southwest side and in the southwest suburbs (but also live elsewhere 
in the metropolitan area), other Arab groups are dispersed across the 
north side of Chicago and in the north, northwest and western suburbs 
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of the city. In the 1990s, some two thousand Iraqi refugees were settled 
on the north side. Because of their location, because most were Shica 
Muslims (and of low socio-economic status) and, possibly, because of 
the unique political circumstances between Iraq and the US, their inter­
action with other Arabs in Chicago (including earlier migrating Iraqis) 
has been limited. 
The practice of Islam among Arab Muslims in the early 19808 
In the early 1980s, when I conducted my first ethnographic study of the 
city's Arab community, there were some 20,000 Palestinians living in 
metropolitan Chicago. Thousands were Christian, but the majority were 
Muslim and lived on the southwest side of the city, even though the 
movement of the middle class to the southwest suburbs had already 
begun. The Palestinian Muslims were by far the largest Arab group in 
metropolitan Chicago. Field notes and interviews taken from research 
that I conducted between 1982 and 1985 provide rich empirical data on 
the practice of Islam early in the decade. 
During this time, Islam was, at best, a way of life for Chicago's Pales­
tinian Muslims. In fact, most of the second-generation (American-born) 
Palestinian-Muslim women whom I interviewed said that they knew 
more about Christianity than Islam. Few of the immigrant Palestinian­
Muslim women acknowledged practicing their faith beyond fasting dur­
ing Ramadan and occasionally reading the Qur'an. Islamic dress was 
uncommon and the jilbiib (ankle-length, loose-fitting coat) was never 
seen in public. Wearing the �ijab was largely limited to newly-arrived, 
married, peasant women who had less than a high-school education and 
the small number of Palestinian women who had previously lived in the 
countries of the Gulf. The former were viewed not as religious women 
invoking modesty, but as representatives of a traditional Palestinian 
peasantry, whose way of life and cultural symbols (such as embroidered 
dresses) Palestinian nationalism was fighting to preserve. 
Despite a long-standing commercial relationship between Arab Mus­
lims (as sellers) and African Americans (as buyers), there were limited 
spiritual and congregational relationships between Arab and African 
American Muslims. Although some immigrant Palestinians taught Ara­
bic at Chicago's Nation of Islam (NOI) institutions, recorded history 
notes that differences between the Sunni Islam of the immigrants and 
the Black nationalism of the NOI made shared religious congregations 
difficult (Curtis 2002). The religious life of Arab Muslims in Chicago was 
not, therefore, a product of fusion with African-American Islam. 
In my original study, I asked immigrant and American-born I'alestiJUan.. 
Muslim women between the ages of 18 and 40 whether religion was 
important in their lives, why it was or was not, and to provide relevant 
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examples taken from their day-to-day experiences. More than eighty 
percent of both groups said that Islam was important in their lives. In 
response to why and how it was important, they described Islam in 
terms of its values and prohibitions. They did not, however, describe it 
as a spiritual force in their lives or as a source of strength and guidance. 
Islam was about family cohesion, respect for elders, modesty, chastity, 
being a good person and fasting during Ramadan; it was against alco­
hol, drugs and pre-marital sex. Muslim holidays were celebrated, but 
they generally lacked deep spiritual content. Few of my informants 
engaged in interventive religious practices-seeking access to God by 
praying, whether routinely or occasionally. 
Answers to my questions about the importance of religion in their 
lives and how it manifested itself are indicative of this state. Normative 
responses included: 
My religion says to me not to drink, not have boyfriends and girlfriends, 
to respect your brothers and family, to listen to them, and to thank God 
for everything. 
Our religion says that we should stay together, work together, that we 
should do everything together. 
Our religion is Muslim and it is very important to me. We read the 
Qur'an and my father tells us things. We have to pray and fast, but I 
don't pray, just the fasting. 
Yes, [Muslim] holidays I celebrate. My husband doesn't care so much 
because he's been here SO long and just got busy. I don't fast now .. .. I don't 
pray so much now, because I have baby and I have to be dean to pray. 
I don't follow it very strictly although I do adhere to the basic principles. 
Q: Do you practice it formally? A: Do you mean praying five times a 
day? No, I don't. But I do fast and refrain from alcohol and drugs. I try 
to be good sometimes, most of the time. 
There are things I cannot do because of my religion. I could not go to the 
beach here and not cover up. Yes, I do fast. 
It is my background, but I don't pray five times a day. My parents were 
not religious. Not where they practiced it daily. My mother knows the 
verses of the Qur'an, but does not go to the mosque. It has been prac­
ticed from within in Our daily lives; this is our religion. 
Indeed, these responses show that 'Muslim' was moving toward 
becoming a cultural identity because Islam's spiritual core was missing. 
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This cultural identity was not necessarily a conscious rejection of reli­
gion; more accurately, it was the option available and the way of life 
prevalent at the time. Those who clearly chose to be cultural Muslims 
answered questions about religion much like the following woman: 
I am a Muslim only in the sense that it identifies me and is inbred in me, 
I do not practice. My husband is Muslim, too. My family was never that 
religiously-oriented, never fasted. 
The reasons for this state of religiosity in the early and mid-1980s 
were embedded in contemporaneous socio-political conditions in the 
United States, Palestine and Jordan. In the US, these Muslim women 
were part of a religious minority in a Christian-majority society. In met­
ropolitan Chicago, in particular, they had no established religious insti­
tutions. There was no viable mosque (see below) nor were there 
avenues for formal religious instruction or spiritual development. In the 
early to mid-1980s, the Palestinian Muslim community had two reli­
gious leaders who could officiate at Muslim marriages and lead 
prayers, but both of these men had other occupations. One worked in 
sales and the other was a real estate agent. There were quite a few com­
munity institutions, however. These embraced the ideals of secular 
nationalism and pan-Arabism, and included Christians, Muslims and 
Jews who shared the same aspirations for Palestinian statehood, human 
rights, democracy and justice-as well as the fall of Arab regimes com­
promising these objectives. 
Because Chicago lacked appropriate religious institutions, the Mus­
lim education of the second generation was composed almost solely of 
what their parents had taught them. It was often the case that parents 
worked long hours and had little time and energy to transmit religiOUS 
knowledge. It was most efficient to pass on values and prohibitions­
about family, modesty, generosity, chastity, diet, intoxicants, sexuality, 
fasting and holidays. The following responses to the question, "where 
did you learn about your religion?," give a sense of the religious instruc­
tion characteristic of this period. 
Basically, what my parents told me and I read some about it, but noth­
ing formal. 
We read the Qur)an and my father tens us things. 
I am a Muslim, but in name only. I believe in God, but do not participate. 
Because we never had a mosque to go to and my parents worked and 
did not have time to teach us the Qur'an verses. But I think now 1 am 
becoming more interested. 
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I never went to a mosque, I don't think. When I was younger we never 
went to a mosque because there weren't any. I always thought my religion 
was really very, very different from everybody else's. I know more about 
Christianity than my own religion, being raised in this country. Every time 
we saw on TV The Ten Commandments, Jesus of Nazareth, or something like 
that, my parents would tell us to sit down and tell us how it is different. 
While fasting during the month of Ramadan was considered impor­
tant and observed by many, praying was uncommon, whether by immi­
grant parents or immigrant or American-born children. Indeed, most of 
the latter did not know how to perform $alii (prayers). One woman spoke 
about going to Palestine for a visit when a young adult and being pitied 
by her relatives for not knowing how to pray. 
Even the concept of women covering their hair as a religious practice 
was not mentioned by interviewees in relation to discussions of Islam, 
and the number of second-generation Arab-American Muslim women 
who wore the bijab was negligible. But foregoing the f:zijiib was not neces­
sarily about being in America. Only the women mentioned above, who 
wore traditional embroidered dresses and the flowing, white, sheer scarf 
of the Palestinian peasant, wore the f:zijiib; urban women and the large 
corps of young, adult, Palestinian women with high-school and college 
educations emigrating from Palestine and Jordan did not. Indeed, newly­
immigrating young women who wore the f:zijiib were expected to take it 
off in the United States or risk being considered mutakhallif (backward). 
At that time, this act did not evoke as much conflict as might be expected 
from the perspective of today, nor did it provoke substantial parental dis­
approval. Wearing the bijab had become increasingly uncommon in much 
of Palestine and Jordan. The 'modem Muslim woman' was not mul;rajjaba. 
Consider these conversations with Palestinian-Muslim women: 
My mother does not wear traditional clothes. When she was young she 
wore them for 20 years. 
Q: Does you mother wear a veil or anything like that? A: No. 
Q: If you were still back home in Palestine, do you think you would be 
the same way? A: Yes. 
Q: Do you fast? A: No. My parents are very strict Muslims, but we did 
not keep up with them. I used to tell my father there are many women 
who cover their heads and faces and are not nice, and you should be 
thankful that I do not do those things. 
If I say I am Arabian, people are surprised. Some met me and asked 
where is my veil? Now it is not that way. Some women do wear the veil 
still, but not all of them. 
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Only among the minority of Palestinian women, those arriving from 
Arab Gulf countries, where the �ijab was still commonly worn, did one 
hear of anguished experiences when women were asked by others to 
remove their headscarves. 
The state of religious knowledge and practice described above was 
not merely the result of being in the United States. Modernity, foreign 
occupation, Westernization, secularism, communism and nationalism 
each played a role in marginalizing religious rituals and practices in 
much of the post-colonial Islamic world. So when Palestinian, Egyptian, 
Iraqi, Lebanese and Syrian Muslims migrated to the US in the 1980s or 
before, many had already cast aside a number of religious practices. The 
everyday experience of being a Muslim in the United States was, of 
course, different from being a Muslim in a Muslim country, but the 
range and degree of difference between the two geographic spaces was 
not as great as might be expected given the wide institutional and cul­
tural disparities. Moreover, Islam reduced of its rituals and practices 
rendered adjustment to American society and culture easier than it 
might otherwise have been-although this was not the primary reason 
for the secularism of immigrants and their children. Life in the US was 
challenging and negative stereotypes of Arabs were abundant. Immi­
grant and second-generation Arabs of all religious faiths drew strength 
and pride from ideas based upon nationalism, pan-Arabism and the his­
toric magnificence and resilience of their culture; they also maintained 
deep, transnational relationships. But, in time, these organizing ideolo­
gies lost meaning in the Arab community, beaten into submission 
worldwide by the outcomes of the 1990-91 Gulf War, the first Palestin­
ian intifiiqa and the failed peace process. Islam emerged as an option for 
filling the moral and spiritual vacuum created by their absence. While 
an Islam reduced of its spirituality was no aid in coping with the chal­
lenging aspects of American society, a vibrant Islam could be a real 
asset. 
Institution-building 
The Muslim population of Chicago grew larger and more diverse in the 
1970s and 1980s, mainly due to migration enabled by changes in US 
immigration law. Emigrants from Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, 
India and Pakistan, as well as smaller numbers from Iran, Turkey, 
Yemen, Afghanistan and Morocco, and a continuing stream of Palestini­
ans made metropolitan Chicago their home. In the late 19705, pan-ethnic 
communal celebrations of major Islamic holidays began to be held in 
large public forums, such as McCormick Place. Then came institution­
building. As noted above, the Palestinian-Muslim community was the 
largest immigrant-origin Arab-Muslim community in Chicago and 
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developed a residential concentration on the southwest side of the city 
and in its southwest suburbs. In 1981, they completed construction of a 
mosque in the southwest suburb of Bridgeview after more than twenty 
years of fund raising spearheaded by the Palestinian Ladies Society. 
Unable to complete construction without external funders, community 
leaders turned to wealthy donors in the oil-rich Gulf States for charita­
ble support. According to the Chicago Tribune (Ahmed-Ullah et al. 2004), 
they received more than $350,000 from donors in Kuwait, $152,000 from 
the Saudi government, and $135,000 from the government of the United 
Arab Emirates. Donations from wealthy Arabs or their governments to 
Arab institutions with fewer resources were common before the Gulf 
War. This sort of support, for example, allowed secular institutions like 
Palestine's Bir Zeit University and AI-Maqasid Hospital to pay salaries 
and remain open. 
The Bridgeview mosque was initially a place where men prayed on 
Fridays, women held meetings on Saturdays and weekday evenings, and 
children learned Arabic on Sundays. But when a full-time, religiously­
trained imam was brought from Egypt to provide religious leadership for 
the mosque, major changes started to occur. The imlim put spiritual and 
ritual substance into the practice of Islam. While no one was forced to be 
religious, those who chose to be were taught to adhere carefully to the 
Qur'an and traditions of the Prophet. This required, in turn, modifica­
tions in the behaviour of the faithful, provoking change in the overall 
comfort level and in accommodation with the normative practices of 
American society. The isolation of Chicago's Muslim community was 
over as it was now linked with the global world of Islam-and that world 
was on the verge of a transformation. The transnational links of earlier 
migrants had not been enough to give substance to Islam because these 
migrants had come at a time when Islamic practice was weak and 
because most had adopted the prevalent community ethos that living in 
the United States required accommodations to dominant Christian and 
secularized society. 
It would seem normal and natural that persons practicing a religion 
should be asked by religious leaders at a religious institution to respect 
and apply the teachings of their religion in their daily lives. But when, 
for example, the new imlim required women to wear head scarves in all 
parts of the mosque, he provoked conflict with women community lead­
ers (who had raised the funds for the mosque), who were not in the habit 
of covering their hair. (It is interesting to note that the practice of selling 
alcohol, an occupation held by a large propertion of the mosque' s male 
congregation and supporting a large percentage of families, did not 
become the object of religious dispute.) A battle over who controlled the 
mosque was eventually launched between Muslims who sought to 
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practice Islam as they had in the past and Muslims who sought stricter 
religious purity. The dispute ended in a court case. The Circuit Court of 
Cook County decided in 1983 that the mosque's board of directors and 
the North American Islamic Trust, which now held title to the mosque, 
had corporate control over it. In 1985, the mosque's board brought a new 
imam to the mosque. Still the imam in 2005, Sheikh Jamal is a Palestinian 
trained in Islamic studies at a Saudi university who initially came to the 
US to teach Arabic to African-American Muslims. 
In the 1990s, the practice of Islam among Chicago's Muslims surged 
quantitatively and qualitatively, although wide variations continued to 
exist within the community. The number of Muslims attending Friday 
prayers at the Bridgeview mosque increased from about 75 in 1982 to 
more than 800 in 1993 {to nearly 2000 today).4 This increase has not been 
due to migration alone: local experiences and global developments have 
contributed to a rise in religiosity. By the 1990s, newly-arriving Arab­
Muslim immigrants had experienced Islamic revival in their homelands 
and a larger proportion of new immigrants was spiritually and ritually 
committed to Islam than in prior times. Some earlier immigrants experi­
enced a change in the meaning of religion in their lives upon return vis­
its to their homelands. Increasingly, the American-born children of Arab 
immigrants found spiritual depth and meaning in the practice of 
Islam-many of them despite what they saw as their parents' compro­
mised form of religious living. In addition, there were now a few Islamic 
schools to which more affluent parents could send their children for an 
education embraced by Islamic teachings. For these American Muslims, 
the universal values of Islam and the strength of their religiosity helped 
them to cope with their particular local experiences as homogenized, 
dehumanized and voiceless Arabs in America (Ahmed-Ullah et al. 20(4). 
In earlier times, these spiritual needs had been met by the hope, dignity 
and vision offered by nationalist institutions, but most of these institu­
tions were devastated after the 1990-91 Gulf War.5 
Objective indicators of the change 
Objective indicators of these changes in religiosity among Arab Muslims 
in Chicago are numerous. They were evident in the mid-l990s and have 
become dominant since the turn of the twenty-first century. Within the 
large Palestinian community, some village-based societies still hold occa­
sional functions, however, all but one of the Palestinian community cen­
tres have closed and mosques have taken their place as venues for social 
activities, political discussions, lectures and community services. l;lalitl 
meat markets and Islamic clothing stores have opened across metropoli­
tan Chicago. A change in values has also become evident at the institu­
tional level. For example, excluding Christian and private gatherings, 
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liquor is no longer served at public events sponsored by Arab secular 
institutions. A dramatic play of these values was evident at the Arab 
American Institute's 1996 Democratic National Convention Gala in 
Chicago where, at the insistence of local donors, only coffee, tea and soft 
drinks were served at its late-night (10 pm-l am) party for political lead­
ers and candidates. 
Arab student organizations at local universities have become weak or 
ceased operation, while Muslim student organizations, especially the 
Muslim Students Association (MSA), have begun to flourish. Islamic pro­
fessional associations and social service agencies have increased in num­
ber and in activities. Similarly, there is growing demand for social 
workers with an Islamic perspective at mainstream agencies. At the 
national level, Islamic civic institutions, such as the Council on American­
Islamic Relations, have begun organizing and engaging in advocacy and 
mainstream political participation. After the 11 September 2001 attacks on 
the US, these activities grew further and expanded at the local level as 
Muslims realized the importance of decreasing their institutional and 
social isolation. Their links with mainstream civil society institutions 
were deepened as they developed partnerships to forestall further attacks 
on Muslim civil rights (Cainkar 2004a; 2004b). 
I have personally observed hundreds of individuals change from sec­
ular to religious since the mid-1990s, while conducting research and par­
ticipating in the Arab and Muslim communities. Immigrant and 
American-born women who had never before covered their hair have 
adopted the �I;jab-once unusual, but now a common sight in the metro­
politan Chicago area. These dramatic changes in the meaning, practice, 
politics and institution-building of Islam within Chicago's Arab-Muslim 
community have been mirrored nationwide (Haddad and Esposito 
1998). Something deeply sociological and critically important to Ameri­
can society has occurred. 
Immigration alone cannot explain this dramatic revival of religiosity 
in the course of the Arab-American community's l00-year history in 
Chicago. According to Census 2000, while 48% of persons of Arab ances­
try in the Chicago Primary Metropolitan Statistical Area are foreign 
born, just about 25% entered the United States after 1990. In addition, a 
large proportion of these post-l990 immigrants are Iraqi Shi{a Muslims 
who came to the US as post-Gulf War refugees and who are not part of 
the Islamicization trend of Sunni Muslims described here (Cainkar 
1999b). This revival also cannot be explained solely as an outcome of 
transnational family relationships or overseas travel, although these, too, 
playa role. Nor can it be explained by the increased migration of South 
Asians. Bosnians, or other Muslims, because contact between these c0m­
munities and Arab Americans has been infrequent, although increasing. 
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Neither migration nor pan-Islamic contacts, institution-building nor 
parental upbringing fully explains why young Muslim adults (ages 
18-30) born and raised in the US chose to find comfort, spiritual growth 
and existential meaning in religiosity. It is more correct to understand the 
Islamic revival occurring among Arab Americans as an outcome of the 
increasing interconnectedness of the world intersecting with the spirits, 
imaginations and challenges of persons who lead very local lives. A 
growing number of Arab-American Muslims are finding ways to under­
stand the perplexing questions of their locally-situated experiences 
through Islam. Their knowledge of Islamic philosophies and rituals has 
been allowed to deepen and flourish through access to books, religious 
leaders, Islamic institutions and organizations in the US, as well as a global 
pool of internet sites, list-servs and satellite TV stations; and through inter­
national travel and relationships with other Muslims, only some of whom 
are immigrants. As Islamic revival has surged in strength and momen­
tum globally, the Islam of the East is now more strongly interwoven with 
the Islam of the West. In the diasporic Muslim communities of the West, 
Islam is being catalyzed not by the pilgrims, scholars, conquerors and 
missionaries who led the early global expansion of the faith, but by the 
experiences of the descendants of refugees, exiles and former slaves, by 
global technology and by the quest for dignity brought about by racism 
and inequality. Knowledge of Islam and its institutional growth is dialec­
tically related to contestations faced by Muslims. As Islam and Muslims 
face more challenges, Islamic revival grows (Cainkar forthcoming). 
Challenges to religious institutions 
With the rise in religiosity among Arab Muslims in OUcago, community 
members have sought to build new religious institutions to meet their 
congregational needs. Their efforts in the southwest suburbs, site of the 
largest concentration of Arabs in metropolitan Chicago, have met with 
significant opposition. In 2000, an attempt by Arab Muslims to purchase 
an abandoned building in suburban Palos Heights for conversion into a 
mosque was halted due to public protest. The city counci1 voted to pay the 
AI Salaam Mosque Foundation $200,000 to back out of its contract with 
the vendors of the property, but the compensation plan was vetoed by an 
embarrassed mayor (Martin 2000). The Muslims filed a discrimination 
lawsuit, which they lost in 2005. In 2004, another group of soutwest 
suburban Arab Muslims sought to build a mosque in an unincorporated 
area near Orland Park. Opposition raged and the Orland Park city coun­
cil (which sought to annex the land) was forced to hold three public hear­
ings on the matter. 
The issues raised by most opponents to the mosque had little to do 
with Orland Park; they were global. Opponents invoked the war in Iraq, 
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international terrorism, the purported violent essence of Islam and 
homeland security. The following abbreviated quotes provide a sense of 
these discourses. 
We care about America. We care about what's going on because we 
don't want you to bring it here. We're not saying that you'll bring it, but 
you must understand that because you're tied in with this religion and 
a possible mosque in Orland Park, it will come to our doorstep. 
Can you give a guarantee to me that these Muslims and their mosque 
are not going to be terrorists? 
A Baptist minister made the following statement: 
Now, as a Christian, a Baptist and an American, I'm a firm believer in reli­
gious liberty and favour any religious group buying property or erecting 
a house of worship-but liberty has limits! No group that jeopardizes our 
personal safety or our national security is deserving of our tolerance. I 
think, at this point, it would be helpful, fair and important to make a dis­
tinction between radical Muslims and moderate Muslims. The radical 
Muslim terrorists kill people every day. Moderate Muslims do not kill 
people. Moderate Muslims supply the cash to the militant Muslims. 
In September 2004, Cook County Clerk David Orr withdrew the 
polling license of the Baptist minister's church, citing the offensive and 
undemocratic character of his public statements as a member of the 
mosque opposition. 
An Arab-American doctor spoke of his treatment of neighbourhood 
children in the hospital emergency room and his solid membership in 
the local community. He asked rhetorically: "What have these Muslims 
done to you?" The audience shouted: "9/11!" Another Arab American 
spoke of growing up in the southwest suburbs, changing his name to 
Nick and aSSimilating into American society. He declared that, after the 
rancour expressed during the hearings, he was changing his name back 
to Ibrahim. Surely, this experience will evolve into more than a symbolic 
name change for Nick. Like many others before him, Nick will be pro­
pelled by discrimination and malice into one of two choices: living in a 
state of alienation from mainstream, white SOCiety or building his self­
esteem, pride and dignity through Islam. The presence of other Mus­
lims, Muslim institutions, Muslim websites and Muslim list-servs will 
nurture his spiritual growth, knowledge and faith. But his discovery of 
religion will be an outcome of his American experience. 
The 2004 Orland Park mosque battle points to a number of important 
post-9jII paradoxes. The mosque dispute w as settled when the Orland 
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Park city council voted unanimously to  annex the land slated for the 
mosque, thereby approving the mosque's construction permit. Each city 
council member invoked his or her duty to support the US constitution 
and the guaranteed right to freedom of religion. The mayor of Orland 
Park had previously sent letters to all town residents stating his support 
for the mosque. Contrast these outcomes with the earlier mosque dis­
pute in 2000, when Muslims were openly rebuffed by elected officials 
and then pressured to back down on their lawsuit. In the post-9j11 con­
text, at the same time as they experienced organized opposition and ver­
bal backlash, Muslims showed greater local power and evoked greater 
local respect than they had only a few years before (even though the two 
communities are adjacent and demographically similar). Finally, as pre­
liminary data from my post-9/11 impact study show, increasing hostil­
ity and discrimination against Muslims are behind continuing rises in 
religiosity among (formerly) secular Muslims. 
Conclusion: The dialectic has unfolded 
Scholars have focused upon explaining the Islamic revival occurring in 
the West as an outcome of immigration, transnational ties, foreign money 
and events occurring within the Islamic world. That is, Islamic revival 
has been viewed as something foreign, allowing an easy leap to the con­
clusion that it is, therefore, anti-Western and threatening. This study 
shows that experiences particular to the United States play an important 
role in American Islamic revival. Much of Islam's appeal is due to its res­
onance to daily life events occurring in the United States and its capacity 
to offer meaning and build resilience: consider Hirschman (2003, 26) and 
Partes's concept of "refuge, respectability, and resources." American­
born Arabs, who are neither foreigners nor anti-Western, are increasingly 
choosing to be Muslim in practice and in name, irrespective of their par­
ents' religiosity or lack thereof. They find strength in the spirituality of 
Islam and hope in its message of justice and equality. In this regard, the 
revival of Islam among American Muslims is not unlike historic African­
American experiences with Islam. As with African Americans, Arab 
Americans and immigrant Muslims experience negative and stereotypic 
representations in mainstream society, discrimination, dehumanization, 
political exclusion and voicelessness. Their youth experience alienation in 
the schools and have to combat self-hatred imbued by textbooks, Hal­
loween costumes, video games, talk shows and movies that portray them 
as barbaric. Although not at the same levels as the African-American 
experience, these conditions are similar to those out of which Noble Drew 
Ali, Elijah Mohamed, Malcolm X and Wallace D. Mohammed offered a 
message of hope and dignity to African Americans through Islam. This is 
not simply Islam by heredity, force, or foreign invasion. 
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African-American Islam was contested in an earlier era-by Muslim 
immigrants for its authenticity, by members of the civil rights movement 
for its separatism and by the US government because of its effectiveness 
in organizing African-American opposition to structural racism. Now, 
however, conflicts with Islam are framed in global terms. When Catholics 
and Jews migrated in large numbers to the United States, the religious 
conflicts that they faced were largely seen as domestic concerns. Today, 
however, the US is a global superpower and American Muslims face 
challenges of a different sort. Muslims have been represented as enemies 
of the West, in which case they must be seen as foreigners and Islam as 
an alien religion. But the embrace of Islam by a significant number of sec­
ond-generation Arabs (as well as South Asians, Eastern Europeans and 
Africans) will have, in time, a major impact on the mutual accommoda­
tions of American society and Muslims. Because their upbringing and 
Islamicization are largely American experiences, they are more able than 
their immigrant parents to cross barriers of culture, race and ethnicity 
and to forge pan-Islamic relationships. Their knowledge of American 
methods of organizing will increase Muslim civic and political integra­
tion in American society. They will begin to influence events occurring in 
the broader Islamic world. The complex dialectic between Islam and the 
West will continue to unfold as Islam becomes institutionally and 
socially acknowledged as an American religion. 
NOTES 
1 An interesting discussion of these and other terms is found in Sadiq Al Azm's 
Isillmic fundlimentQlism Reconsidered. 
2 The research on Islamic revival in the United States is funded by a Carnegie Cor­
poration Scholar Award. 
1 This number is an estimate and excludes Assyrians, whose origins are in Iraq or 
Iran. These numbers do not match census data. See Cainkar (forthcoming 2(05) for a 
qualitative assessment of the accuracy of Census 2000 data. 
4 According to ongoing data collection in a study of second-generation Arab- and 
South Asian-Muslims in metropolitan Chicago. 
� I discuss these changes in more detail in Cainkar 1999a. One outcome of the Gull 
War was the expulsion of Palestinians from Gulf countries, including Kuwait. This 
act seriously depleted secular nationalist financial resources. 
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